Recently, Wang Dong, professor at the School of International Studies and executive director of the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding(iGCU) at Peking University, published a cover article titled “Steps toward Trust: China’s Approach in Northeast Asia” in the latest issue (Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2025) of the internationally renowned policy journal Global Asia. The article focuses on the security situation in Northeast Asia, offering an in-depth analysis of the complex geopolitical context and China’s “responsible reassurance” strategy in the region.
Reassurance is a strategic tool used by states to mitigate security dilemmas and strengthen security relations. It involves gauging other parties’ intentions based on their responses to goodwill gestures, as opposed to threats, and employs both verbal commitments and concrete measures to reduce miscalculation or the threat of armed conflict. Amid growing geopolitical complexity, the desire for mutual reassurance among Northeast Asian countries has become more pronounced. A reassurance based security mechanism could contribute to stability and promote peace and development there and in the broader Asia-Pacific region.
BLOC FORMATION, STRATEGIC RIVALRY
Influenced by history, shifting power dynamics and external interference, Northeast Asia is witnessing a growing trend toward bloc rivalry, with the US, Japan and South Korea on one side, and China, North Korea, and Russia on the other. Competing visions regarding issues such as the Korean Peninsula intensify regional tensions.
Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has a generally hardline stance on China, which is likely to push Japan even closer to the US on regional security issues, including the Korean Peninsula. Takaichi holds right-wing positions on multiple sensitive issues such as incorporating “stability in the Taiwan Strait” into Japan’s national security doctrine. A follower of late prime minister Shinzo Abe, she has consistently visited the Yasukuni Shrine and denied Japanese aggression during the Second World War; on territorial disputes such as the Diaoyu Islands (known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands) she is also a hardliner.
Against this backdrop, the Takaichi administration will likely continue a policy of deterrence toward North Korea, actively supporting trilateral co-operation between the US, Japan, and South Korea. She has called North Korea a “threat to the peace and security of Japan” and advocates enhanced joint deterrence. This aligns with Japan’s continuous increase in military spending. Arguably, this not only increases North Korea’s resentment but could also elevate military and strategic confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea, while consolidating its alliance with the US, wants to enhance its strategic autonomy. In President Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration, strong pro-US and pro-Japan policies dominated, bolstering trilateral security co-operation. After Lee Jae Myung became president in June 2025, he deviated from his previous progressive stances and adjusted diplomatic priorities by visiting Japan even before the US. Apparently, Lee wanted to manage Japan-South Korea differences, enhance mutual trust, and seek greater leverage for Seoul within the alliance framework. Unfortunately, Lee’s move toward the US and Japan risks reinforcing, not alleviating, bloc-based competition.
Despite recent attempts by US President Donald Trump to re-engage with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang prefers to deepen strategic co-ordination with Russia and China. This shift is characterized by a two-pronged approach. First, strengthening its military alliance with Russia, including sending tens of thousands of soldiers to fight alongside Russia in Ukraine, reportedly in exchange for advanced military technology from Moscow. Second, Pyongyang is consolidating ties with China, as shown by Kim Jong Un’s attendance at the Sept. 3 military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Beijing, two visits to
China in a month by North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, and an invitation for Chinese senior leaders to attend the 80th anniversary celebrations of the Workers’ Party of the DPRK. This is not only driven by North Korea’s profound distrust in the reliability of US policy but is directly linked to the strengthening of US-Japan-South Korea co-operation. Drawing lessons from the unpredictability of Trump’s first term, North Korea remains highly vigilant against any outreach from Washington. Pyongyang has said it is “no longer interested in unproductive talks,” insisting that the US must lift economic sanctions first and recognize that North Korea’s nuclear status is “irreversible.” Most recently, Trump’s attempt to arrange a meeting with Kim during his visit to South Korea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit was rebuffed. North Korea prioritizes stronger relations with China and Russia as a hedge against geopolitical risks and a way to gain more leverage for any future negotiations with Washington.
This intensifying bloc formation in Northeast Asia poses a significant obstacle to mutual reassurance among the parties involved. The standoff between the two camps undermines strategic trust, making it difficult to foster the co-operative atmosphere necessary for reassurance. Joint military exercises led by the US involving Japan and South Korea have further raised tensions. North Korea has condemned these actions as a development “that seriously threatens the security of the Korean Peninsula and the region, necessitating an absolute military response to thoroughly crush the aggressive military activities of the United States, Japan, and South Korea."
INCREASED UNCERTAINTY IN TRUMP 2.0
Bloc rivalry is further complicated by the strategic changes of the Trump administration’s second term. Trump’s second-term shift is likely to be the most significant variable in the security landscape of Northeast Asia. According to multiple media reports, the US’s new 2025 National Defense Strategy (NDS) will differ from a previous focus on the so-called China threat and global security. The core of the new strategy is to prioritize homeland and Western Hemisphere security, adjust the approach to competition with China, scale back global military commitments, and urge allies to “take more responsibility for their own security.” This will compel countries in the region, particularly Japan, to adjust their security strategies.
In recent months, China-US relations have swung from escalating friction to a gradual easing of tensions. In September, the US further expanded its sanctions against China, prompting Beijing to announce strengthened controls on the export of rare earths and related technologies as a countermeasure. The US initially reacted with Trump threatening 100 percent tariffs. But by mid-October, he took a more pragmatic stance, describing the idea as “not sustainable.” This created a window for dialogue, and trade talks in Kuala Lumpur led to an agreement to suspend certain retaliatory measures. The summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, seemed to have a positive outcome. It was the culmination of five high-level economic and trade talks between the two nations in 2025, with the two leaders approving the consensus reached by their negotiating teams. The summit, along with an announced Trump visit to China in April 2026 and Xi’s reciprocal visit to the US, are expected to help stabilize relations. If the trend continues, this augurs well for rebuilding trust on broader issues and for stabilizing the situation in Northeast Asia.
Currently, Japan faces three strategic options: First, proactively confront China by strengthening co-operation with regional partners such as the Philippines and India. Second, move closer to China by enhancing trilateral co-ordination among China, Japan and South Korea and reducing dependence on the US. Third, maintain the existing hedging strategy — relying on the alliance with the US for security while engaging in pragmatic economic exchanges with China.
Following the withdrawal of the Komeito Party from the ruling coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Sanae Takaichi, formed a new governing alliance with the conservative Japan Innovation Party, which subsequently secured her election as prime minister. This shift significantly diminished the moderating influence of pragmatic forces within the government. Under this structure, the Takaichi administration’s foreign policy has taken a pronounced rightward tilt. Indeed, following Takaichi’s election, China departed from diplomatic convention by not sending a congratulatory message.
Despite expressing a desire to build “stable Japan-China relations” during the APEC meeting, Takaichi’s government has accelerated defense spending, aiming to make Japan a “normal country.” Takaichi administration policy is centered on strengthening the Japan-US alliance, actively promoting defense co-operation with US allies and taking provocative actions against China at multilateral forums such as APEC, including inappropriate contact with representatives from Taiwan.
Furthermore, Takaichi told the Japanese parliament on Nov. 7 that an attack on Taiwan would be a “survival-threatening situation,” thus signaling Japan’s intention to intervene militarily in a potential Taiwan Strait crisis. Her remarks triggered a strong rebuke from Beijing, which sees her provocative comments as not only significantly undermining the political foundation of China-Japan relations, but also gravely jeopardizing the post-war international order. Takaichi tried to turn down the heat, saying on Nov. 10 that her previous remarks were merely a “hypothetical answer” and promising to avoid making similar statements in the future. Yet Takaichi’s refusal to retract her comments is viewed by China as unrepentant, and it has indeed continued to fuel the tensions between Beijing and Tokyo.
Takaichi’s moves highlight a confrontation- oriented foreign policy that exacerbates regional tension. She has even drawn criticism from three former Japanese prime ministers, Yoshihiko Noda, Yukio Hatoyama and Shigeru Ishiba, who all expressed concern about the risks of such reckless comments. Even Toru Hashimoto, founder of the right-leaning Innovation Party and LDP’s coalition partner has publicly questioned Takaichi’s wisdom of making such a provocative comment. Moreover, her administration’s hinted intent to revise Japan’s longstanding “Three NonNuclear Principles” (not possessing, producing or permitting the presence of nuclear weapons), yet another indication of its tilt at a radical right-wing policy shift, has drawn widespread domestic criticism, prompting the fourth former prime minister, Fumio Kishida, to publicly reprimand the move. While tensions with China continue to escalate, Takaichi has at the same time soured relations with Russia, South Korea and North Korea over territorial disputes and history issues. Historically, rarely has any Japanese prime minister successfully antagonized all of Japan’s neighbors in the short span of one month after taking office.
In its policy towards North Korea, the Takaichi administration has prioritized resolving the “abduction issue,” while pushing for a Japan-North Korea summit and strengthening military co-ordination with the US. These assertive policies face significant constraints, including Japan’s high economic dependence on China — it is already being hurt by an unofficial Chinese boycott on travel to Japan prompted by her Taiwan remarks. Chinese economic ties, uncertainties in US strategy and the ruling coalition’s lack of a majority in the parliament, all constrain Takaichi’s hardline policies and render her administration’s foreign policy shift not only adventurous but also highly fragile.
In South Korea, President Lee Jae Myung’s administration has adopted a pragmatic policy toward the Korean Peninsula, centered on his “END Initiative” (Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization). Its core principles are respecting North Korea’s system, renouncing “absorption-style unification,” and avoiding hostile acts. Concrete measures include halting loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts at the border and planning a phased restoration of the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement to reduce tensions. Denuclearization is a complex, long-term goal and Lee advocates a flexible, stage-based approach while pursuing North-South dialogue. This policy is a break with the previous government’s confrontational stance, reflecting Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy” that seeks to balance the US alliance with stability in relations with China. That said, the END Initiative still faces North Korea’s rejection of the “phased denuclearization” approach.
In the above context, a strategic contraction during the Trump 2.0 era could significantly loosen the US’s coercive posture in Northeast Asia, granting regional countries greater strategic flexibility. Although Japan tends to favor the status quo and a hedging strategy, it remains adaptable, and China’s strategic maneuvering will play a crucial role.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Profound, complex changes are accelerating across the globe, shaped by transformations not seen since the end of the Second World War. China consistently adheres to the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation in its relations with the US, striving for a stable, healthy, and sustainable bilateral relationship. China’s strategic choices reflect what can be called “responsible reassurance” — emphasizing strategic restraint, clear signaling and effective crisis management to reduce miscalculation and create conditions for stability in bilateral relations.
Amid the intensified US-China strategic competition since Trump’s first term, China has adjusted its approach on the Korean Peninsula by strengthening strategic coordination with North Korea. Key signals include Xi’s visit there in 2019 — the first of its kind in 14 years — and Kim Jong Un’s high-profile attendance at China’s commemoration of the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” and “Global Anti-Fascist War” in September. During high-level meetings, both sides have emphasized traditional friendship and strategic co-operation, with the nuclear issue pushed to the back burner. During the Sept. 4 summit meeting, Xi said that China “attach[es] great importance to the traditional friendship between China and the DPRK,” and “stand[s] ready to maintain, consolidate and develop” relations. “No matter how the international landscape may evolve,” Xi said, “this position will stay unchanged.”
When it comes to the Korean Peninsula, Xi noted that China “has always held an objective and fair stance,” and would be willing to “continue to strengthen coordination” with North Korea and “do its best to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” In response, Kim Jong Un expressed his “appreciation at China’s fair stance on the Korean Peninsula issue.”
For years, China has held that the root cause of the nuclear issue needs to be addressed — in other words, Pyongyang’s insecurity and sense of being threatened by the US and South Korea. China has long held that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula hinges on a peaceful political settlement. Faced with pressure from co-ordinated measures by the US and its allies, improved relations with North Korea have become a strategic necessity for China.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s most recent visit to North Korea to celebrate the 80th Anniversary of the Workers’ Party of the DPRK underscores China’s commitment to this partnership. China is likely to calibrate its future responses based on how interactions play out between Pyongyang and Washington. China-US economic and trade relations are an important part of bilateral relations. Facing the Trump tariff war, China adopted firm and reciprocal countermeasures while maintaining communications with the US. The two sides held five rounds of high-level talks, reaching multiple interim agreements, including the suspension of certain tariffs and the establishment of a consultation mechanism. Further trade agreements are anticipated following the cooling at APEC. A de-escalation of tariff disputes would not only ease bilateral trade tensions but also contribute to global economic certainty. Moreover, improved economic relations could create opportunities for building trust in the security domain.
In recent years, the US has pursued strategic competition and strengthened its alliance-based partnerships targeting China. Some regional countries have cooperated with the US on contentious issues. But given Trump’s emphasis on deal making, tangible benefits from US-China co-operation could offer Washington an incentive to restrain adventurous behavior by its allies. For instance, in the South China Sea, the US might tacitly permit certain provocative actions by the Philippines but would likely set clear red lines to prevent escalation. This kind of boundarysetting could help avoid miscalculations that might trigger direct confrontation between the two great powers.
Another case in point is the most recent phone call between Xi and Trump, on Nov. 24. In the hour-long call, they reaffirmed the Busan Summit consensus, and expressed satisfaction about the “significant progress” on both sides. Calling the US relationship with China “extremely strong” and saying “it will only get better,” Trump said he had accepted Xi’s invitation to visit China next April and noted his reciprocal offer. In the context of the recent China-Japan disputes, Xi reportedly underscored that “Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order,” and urged the US to “jointly safeguard the victory of [World War II],” while Trump responded positively, stating that “China was a big part of the victory of [World War II],” and reassuring that “the US understands how important the Taiwan question is to China.” Clearly, Trump has got the message and certainly does not want anything to intrude into “the big picture” that he and Xi are “set[ting] sights on.” Shortly afterward, Trump made a phone call to Takaichi, which lasted merely 25 minutes. Reportedly, he told her to “lower the volume” and “not to provoke Beijing on the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty.”
1 Mina Pollmann, “How Will a Takaichi Administration Approach Japan’s Taiwan Policy?” The Diplomat, Oct. 8, 2025, the diplomat.com/2025/10/how-will-a-takaichi-administration-approach-japans-taiwan-policy/
2 Takaichi Sanae, “Statement by TAKAICHI Sanae, Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy, 66th IAEA General Conference,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Sept. 26, 2022, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100402094.pdf
3 Alina Hrytsenko, “North Korea is using Russia’s Ukraine invasion to upgrade its army,” The Atlantic Council, Jan. 23, 2025, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/north-korea-is-using-russias-ukraine-invasion-to-upgrade-its-army/
4 “Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK,” KCNA, July 29, 2025, kcna.co.jp/item/202 5/202507/news29/20250729-01ee.html
5 “Destruction of Balance of Power on Korean Peninsula and in Region Will Never Be Allowed: KCNA Commentary,” KCNA Watch, Sept. 13, 2025, kcnawatch.org/newstream/1757761449-166003298/ Destruction-of-Balance-of-Power-on -Korean-Peninsula-and-in-Region-Will-Never-Be-Allowed%3A-KCNA-Commentary/
6 Paul Mclery and Daniel Lippman, “Pentagon plan prioritizes homeland over China threat,” Politico, Sept. 5 2025, www.politico.com/news/2025/09/05/pentagon-national-defense-strategy-china-homeland-western-hemisphere-00546310
7 Lauren Dezenski and Josh Wingrove, “Trump Says Threatened Tariffs on China ‘Not Sustain-able,’” Bloomberg, Oct. 17, 2025, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-17/trump-says-threatened-high-tariffs-on-china-not-sustainable
8 “General Secretary and President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and President of the State Affairs of he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Kim Jong Un,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Sept. 5, 2025, www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202509/t20250905_11702689.html
9 “President Xi Jinping Speaks with U.S. President Donald J. Trump on the Phone,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Nov. 24, 2025, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202511/t20251124_11759133.html.
Source: https://www.globalasia.org/v20no4/cover/steps-toward-trust-chinas-approach-in-northeast-asia_wang-dong
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