Introduction: Since 1994, the relationship between the United States and the Taliban can be divided into four phases, whose main features are, in order, friendly contacts, intensified differences and contradictions, frontal military conflict, and talks while fighting. This paper briefly outlines this historical lineage, illustrates the main dynamics of the relationship at different stages, and also discusses three major variables, namely, real interests, religious beliefs and ideologies, and third-party factors. The paper argues that a peace agreement in 2020 may potentially open a new phase of U.S.-Taliban relations, but a U.S. withdrawal is not the same as leaving, and a peace agreement is not yet a real peace. In addition to real interests, third-party factors will be the key to influence the future U.S.-Taliban relations.
On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a "peace agreement." The U.S. pledged to complete troop withdrawals within 14 months and to lift sanctions against the Taliban by August 27; the Taliban pledged to take practical measures to prevent forces, including Al-Qaeda, from using Afghan territory to threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies, and promised to launch "intra-Afghan peace talks" on March 10. ".
International opinion on the agreement was mixed. Cheerers and skeptics have their own bases. In any case, the new peace agreement is at least an important event in the history of U.S.-Taliban relations. Whether it will truly constitute a watershed or turning point in the political sense depends on whether the parties can translate their written commitments into political action in the future. The future has not yet arrived. The central task of this article is to analyze the main influencing factors of U.S.-Taliban relations by reviewing their historical evolution in order to improve the understanding of the relationship and its changing trends.
I. Historical Evolution of U.S.-Taliban Relations
Influenced by the war in Afghanistan, people have been accustomed to think that the U.S. and the Taliban are enemies of each other. However, history shows that hostility is not the whole content of the relationship between the two. Since 1994, U.S.-Taliban relations have gone through four stages of change: friendly contacts, intensification of differences and contradictions, full-scale military confrontation, and the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict; among them, pure military confrontation has lasted less than 10 years. Moreover, it is worth noting that although the U.S. government defined the war in Afghanistan as a war on terrorism, it never officially recognized the Taliban as a "terrorist organization".
(I) Phase I: Friendly Contacts (1994-1996)
The origins of U.S.-Taliban relations can be traced back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The founders and early cadres of the Taliban movement had participated in the war against the Soviet Union, and their organizations and political parties had received U.S. support at that time. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States severed its ties with the Afghan resistance. However, beginning in 1994, the U.S. government and oil companies approached the Taliban out of interest in the hydrocarbon resources of the Central Asian-Caspian region.
The U.S. involvement in Central Asia-Caspian oil and gas resources is not based on its own energy needs, but on geostrategic competition, i.e., to break Russia's monopoly on energy transportation routes in the region, to help the countries concerned reduce or even get rid of their dependence on Russia, and to weaken Russia's influence. Brzezinski was outspoken about this. "The primary interest of the United States is to help ensure that no single power controls this geopolitical space alone and that the world has unimpeded access to the region, financially and economically," he said.
At first the U.S. did not make good progress, and around 1994 it found an opportunity in Turkmenistan. At the time, Turkmenistan had proven oil and gas reserves of more than 6 billion tons and 21 trillion cubic meters, respectively, and the energy industry was the backbone of its economy. annual gas production in Turkmenistan remained above 80 billion cubic meters from 1985 to 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to poor export channels, and Turkmenistan was forced to limit production, with annual gas production dropping to 40 billion cubic meters in 1994. The country's economic situation then deteriorated, with its GDP falling from $3.208 billion in 1991 to $2.561 billion in 1994. The American company Unocal took advantage of the situation and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to build the Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistan pipeline at the end of October 1995.
In 1995, it signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkmenistan, committing to purchase 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Turkmenistan. In this context, Afghanistan became the key to the implementation of the pipeline construction plan.
The Afghan civil war was raging and the Mujahidin government in Kabul was in disrepair and unable to restore political order. The Taliban seized the southwestern, western and central regions of Afghanistan in the summer and fall of 1995 and restored peace in the areas under their control. This opened up the theoretical possibility of pipeline construction. Between 1995 and 1996, the White House repeatedly urged Pakistan to help persuade the Mujahideen government to make peace with the Taliban, and in March 1996, B. Rabbani, president of the Mujahideen government, publicly criticized the United States for turning a blind eye to Pakistan's support for the armed Taliban. In early July of the same year, some members of the U.S. Congress met with Unocal in Washington to discuss how to rebuild U.S. interests in Afghanistan and how to help Afghans achieve peace. It was reported afterwards that U.S. leaders would meet with their representatives as soon as the Taliban entered Kabul.
Immediately after the Taliban seized Kabul in late September 1996, Unocal issued a formal statement welcoming the "positive developments" in Afghanistan and saying that peace was in sight. The White House also publicly stated in early October that it would approach the Taliban regime to discuss diplomatic relations. In November of the same year, the U.S. assistant secretary of state told a closed-door meeting of the U.N. General Assembly that the Taliban had brought a new dimension to the long civil war in Afghanistan and called on all governments to reach out to them, saying that "isolating the Taliban is not in the interest of Afghanistan or the countries represented here.
At that time, the U.S. government befriended the Taliban, but in fact there are strategic considerations to contain Iran. Iran has deep roots in Afghanistan and mainly supports the anti-Taliban political forces. The Taliban, on the other hand, maintained close ties with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. During the Clinton administration, the U.S. Congress allegedly allocated a special fund of about $20 million to the CIA to deal with Iran, which all went to the Taliban.
(II) Phase II: Intensification of Differences and Conflicts (1997-September 2001)
The Taliban's entry into Kabul meant a fundamental change in its political identity, i.e., from a local force to a national ruler. Accordingly, there was a major adjustment in its political aspirations and goals of interest. This was the primary reason for the change in its relationship with the United States. During this period, the number, scope, and frequency of contacts and interactions between the two sides increased markedly, expectations of each other increased significantly, and differences and contradictions came to the fore.
The Taliban had two major new expectations of the United States after coming to power. One is to seek diplomatic recognition from and establish diplomatic relations with the United States, and the other is to expect the United States to respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and not interfere in its internal affairs. It must be emphasized that for the Taliban regime, the primary motivation for these two expectations is not so much to be among the international community as it is for domestic political legitimacy considerations. Because it seized power through civil war/violence, former President Rabbani established a government-in-exile in the northern town of Mazar-e-Sharif, with the Northern Alliance as a counterweight. More importantly, Rabbani's government-in-exile also held a seat at the United Nations and maintained diplomatic relations with several countries. Therefore, the Taliban desperately hoped that U.S. diplomatic recognition would change this situation and consolidate its legitimacy. It also wants the United States to refrain from interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs so that it can deliver on its earlier stated political goals of restoring peace and establishing a Shariah order.
The U.S. demands of the Taliban regime center on three points: an end to the civil war, a change in the policy of "discrimination against women," and the expulsion of bin Laden (or his transfer to the United States). These demands are directly related to important interests defined by the U.S. government. Simply put, a "cessation of civil war" is a prerequisite for the implementation and expansion of the South Central Asian oil and gas pipeline program. Calls for changes in women's policies, primarily from U.S. feminist and human rights organizations, have a direct impact on government support and party votes. The "expulsion of bin Laden" is a major threat to U.S. national security because the man has long been an open enemy of the United States and has carried out many successful attacks. Of course, the U.S. government has always been good at wrapping realistic interests in abstract values. Thus we see that U.S. appeals and criticisms of the Taliban during this period were filled with terms such as "peace, human rights and freedom, and anti-terrorism. Because of the vast differences in the effectiveness of the propaganda machine and the degree of linguistic commonality between the two sides, international public opinion quickly developed a stereotype of the Taliban, labeling it as "militant, discriminatory against women, anti-human rights, anti-freedom, and pro-terrorism.
During this period, relations between the two sides were heavily influenced by their respective domestic and regional political situations. In Afghanistan, the military confrontation between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance was stalled. The Afghan civil war was prolonged indefinitely and the construction of oil and gas pipelines was delayed due to the deep involvement of regional players such as Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. On the U.S. side, a wave of feminism has taken hold and the Taliban's women's policies have become a target. Especially after M. Albright's appointment as Secretary of State in January 1997, human rights and women's rights issues gained unprecedented weight in U.S.-Taliban relations. Albright's personal upbringing and convictions have made such issues particularly important to her. While serving as ambassador to the United Nations, she publicly criticized the Taliban, calling their women's policies "a violation of human rights" and recommending international sanctions against them. In her inaugural address, the Secretary of State made it clear that she would focus on promoting human rights and democracy, and combating international terrorism and international crime. She then put women's rights on the U.S. diplomatic agenda as a foreign policy priority. During her visit to Pakistan in November 1997, she denounced the Taliban's gender policies as "despicable. Since then, high-profile public attacks on the Taliban's women's policies have become a fixture of U.S. relations with Afghanistan. Pakistani journalist A. Rashid has described this change in U.S. policy as a "shift from blind faith in the Taliban to a Taliban-opposed approach.
Nevertheless, the U.S.-Taliban engagement has not been disrupted. In late 1997, Unocal arranged for a high-level delegation led by Taliban "Foreign Minister" Mullah Mohammed Ghaus to visit the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. This visit raised the level of U.S.-Taliban relations, and in April 1998, U.S. Representative to the United Nations B. Richardson visited Afghanistan, the highest-ranking U.S. official to do so in more than 20 years.
The real catalyst for the qualitative change in U.S.-Taliban relations was bin Laden, the guest leader of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, who issued a religious edict (fatwa) in February 1998 stating that it was the religious duty of every Muslim to "kill Americans and their allies. Qaeda attacked the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam with car bombs, killing 224 people and injuring more than 4,500. After the incident, the U.S. strongly demanded that the Taliban expel or hand over bin Laden, but failed to do so. The U.S. then launched 75 cruise missiles against Afghanistan on Aug. 20. Relations between the two sides took a sharp turn for the worse, Unocal withdrew, and plans for the oil and gas pipeline were aborted.
(III) Phase III: Frontal Military Conflict (October 2001-2008)
In order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Soviet Union, the U.S. did not send ground troops into Afghanistan at the beginning of the war, but joined hands with Britain to provide air fire support and relied on the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban regime. It is noteworthy that the U.S. calls the war in Afghanistan a war on terror and, in keeping with the need for global counterterrorism, issues annual global terrorism reports. Since 2004, the report has referred to the Taliban primarily as "insurgent forces. "
After the Taliban lost power and completed its reorganization in 2003, its position toward the United States changed significantly. While in power, the Taliban did not take orders from the U.S., but had no intention of openly antagonizing it. But since its resurgence, it has been at the forefront of the war against the United States. It has taken the initiative to attack the United States and its lead International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the form of combat teams, at all possible times and places, and by all possible means (including violent terrorism). As a direct result, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated dramatically and the number of U.S. military casualties continues to rise. As shown in Table 1.
To turn the tide, the United States decided in late 2006 to increase its troops from 21,000 to 31,000. But it did not help. By 2007, Western public opinion began to bemoan the fact that the U.S.-led coalition was "failing.
The United States, of course, could not accept defeat. Even if it had to choose to leave, it had to first declare the end of the war as a "victor" and then retreat with dignity. So we see that President Obama, after taking office in 2009, first ordered a troop increase. The U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan was 32,000 in January of that year and increased to 68,000 in February. At the end of the same year, he decided to further increase the number of troops by 30,000, while announcing that U.S. troops would be gradually withdrawn from July 2011. He also called on the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who are willing to "renounce violence and respect the human rights of their compatriots" in order to achieve peace.
(IV) Phase 4: Talking while fighting (2009-February 2020)
While President Bush Jr. aimed to win a comprehensive victory in the war on terror, President Obama acknowledged the political reality that the United States could not defeat the Taliban by military means. This major change in U.S. attitudes brought U.S.-Taliban relations into a new phase of talking while fighting.
In November 2010, U.S. and Taliban representatives met in Germany. In February of the following year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that she would formally launch peace talks with the Taliban, and formal negotiations were held at the end of that year. Since then, the U.S.-Taliban rivalry has expanded from the military to the political sphere. Both sides have sought to promote talks by fighting, have sought to maximize their respective interests and advantages, and have treated reconciliation as a means rather than an end in itself. This is a key reason why the U.S.-Taliban peace talks process has been so fraught with twists and turns. 2014 saw the two sides reach an agreement to exchange prisoners of war. The negotiations then stalled, with intermittent engagement and no substantive progress.
After Trump took office as U.S. president in 2017, he continued his policy of fighting and talking to the Taliban at the same time. He argued that the U.S. still faced an "enormous" security threat in Afghanistan and could not afford to repeat the mistakes of the hastily concluded Iraq War. To this end, he announced that he would no longer subjectively set a "mission accomplished" deadline, withdrawal time "all depends on the actual situation. He also proposed to use all resources - diplomatic, economic and military - to get a "successful outcome" to make the huge sacrifices the U.S. has made in Afghanistan worthwhile.
However, the situation in Afghanistan has changed significantly in 2018. The underlying dynamics are the mindset of Afghans and the commitment of both the Afghan government and the Taliban to fight for the hearts and minds of the people. President A. Ghani has issued a series of peace initiatives. He first offered "unconditional peace talks" with the Taliban in late February, then announced a one-week cease-fire during Eid al-Fitr (June 12-19) in early June, while mobilizing religious authorities to issue religious edicts calling on the Taliban to accept the government's initiative for peace. The Taliban responded positively, agreeing to a three-day ceasefire for Eid al-Fitr, encouraging its generals to return home to celebrate the holiday with their families, and also releasing some prisoners.
The U.S. government immediately seized this valuable opportunity, and in September 2018, Trump appointed Afghan-born diplomat Z. Khalilzad as his special representative to negotiate with the Taliban. The U.S.-Taliban political reconciliation process thus entered the fast track. After nine rounds of bargaining, the two sides reached a consensus on a draft agreement in August 2019. But new variables reappeared. On the one hand, in contrast to the rapid advancement of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks, the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban have been delayed, and Kabul fears that it will be completely marginalized in the reconciliation process and that the Afghan civil war will intensify. There is no doubt that U.S.-Taliban reconciliation is an important condition for peace in Afghanistan, but just as a railroad needs two tracks to pass, peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without reconciliation within the Afghans; Afghanistan cannot move toward peace with the existence of a single track of U.S.-Taliban reconciliation alone. In this regard, the Afghan government's fears are not unreasonable. Thus, after news spread in August 2019 about a possible secret U.S.-Taliban meeting at Camp David, the Kabul government repeatedly protested publicly.
On the other hand, the Taliban, while actively promoting peace talks with the U.S., have perpetrated a series of high-profile, violent terrorist attacks in Kabul and other cities. Against this backdrop, Trump declared on September 10, 2019, that "the peace talks process with the Taliban is dead." Until December 7 of the same year, the "Doha process" resumed, and the two sides finally reached a peace agreement on February 29, 2020.
Major Factors Affecting U.S.-Taliban Relations
One of the most notable elements of the peace agreement was the withdrawal of troops. The U.S. committed to withdrawing all military forces (currently 13,000) within 14 months. The specific plan is divided into two phases: the first phase, lasting 4.5 months (135 days), will reduce U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 8,600; the second phase, lasting 9.5 months, will remove the remaining troops. In other words, if all goes well, the U.S. will complete the withdrawal in 2021.
Almost certainly, the U.S. withdrawal is different from the decisive pullout in 1992, because the strategic value of the Taliban and Afghanistan in current and future regional and world politics cannot be ignored. So how will U.S.-Taliban relations evolve? Learn from the past. A review of history reveals that there are three key factors that influence the survival and change of the relationship: real interests, religious and ideological differences, and third-party forces. They will continue to play an important role in the coming period.
(i) The strategic value of the Taliban to the United States
This is the fundamental motivation for the U.S. to seek to develop its relationship with the Taliban. In the past 30 years, the U.S. policy toward the Taliban has been clearly driven by interests, from the initial initiative to reach out to the Taliban, to the engagement and struggle with the Taliban regime, to the launching of the war in Afghanistan and the decision to reconcile with the Taliban.
The Taliban's place in U.S. strategy has actually been rising. In the early stages of the relationship, the Taliban did not have independent value in U.S. strategy; prior to 1998, the Taliban's value was subordinate to the U.S. strategic layout of seeking the export of oil and gas resources from Central Asia and containing Iran; between 1998 and 2008, it was mainly due to its "special relationship" with Al-Qaeda. The Taliban's value has been attributed to the U.S.'s pursuit of oil and gas resources from Central Asia and its strategic deployment to contain Iran; from 1998-2008, its "special relationship" with Al-Qaeda. But since 2009, the U.S. has recognized the Taliban as a powerful political and military force in Afghanistan. The Taliban has thus acquired an independent strategic value. This is an intrinsic motivation for the U.S. to actively seek reconciliation with it. From the reconciliation agreement signed in February 2020, the U.S. has treated the Taliban as an important political partner in "building" peace in Afghanistan and maintaining U.S. national security: the agreement, titled the "Agreement on Achieving Peace in Afghanistan," begins with a clear statement that it is to be achieved through "a series of measures to ensure that no organization or individual uses Afghan territory to threaten The agreement is called the "Agreement on Achieving Peace in Afghanistan" and begins with "a series of measures to ensure that no organization or individual uses Afghan territory to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
For the United States, the strategic value of the Taliban is closely linked to the geopolitical value of Afghanistan, which has been the main theater of the U.S. global war on terror since the beginning of the 21st century and the frontline of protecting U.S. national security. in October 2018, Trump adjusted his national security strategy so that terrorism is no longer considered the primary threat to U.S. national security. But with the accelerated return of geopolitical and ideological competition to the international political arena, Afghanistan may have a new mission in the U.S. global strategy. After all, its location at the crossroads of East, Central, South and West Asia and its proximity to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) countries, China, Iran and Pakistan make it a must-see for the United States.
From this perspective, it is easy to see the U.S. commitment to withdraw troops from the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement. If the withdrawal can truly bring peace to Afghanistan, it will be a good thing. Even if it does not, completing the withdrawal itself would change the basic structure of U.S.-Taliban relations since 2001 and could open a new chapter in their relationship. Because the Taliban have been raising the banner of U.S. withdrawal since 2003 as a "justification" for their violent armed struggle, the Taliban's withdrawal would mean that the U.S. would have to withdraw its forces. The U.S. withdrawal means that the Taliban has achieved this stated goal, meaning that the U.S. and the Taliban are no longer military and political adversaries, thus removing an obstacle to the development of a "new relationship" between the two sides.
The peace agreement has actually done some important groundwork for the development of a new relationship between the two sides. For example, in addition to "inviting" the Taliban to work together to build peace in Afghanistan, the United States also gave it a generous gift. The use of the term "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" to refer to the Taliban throughout the agreement, from its title to its content, is unprecedented. While the text of the agreement goes to great lengths to append each subordinate clause to the name - "the United States does not recognize it as a state and commonly refers to it as the Taliban" - the lengthy suffix clearly does not obscure the political significance of the official name: it is a It is a declaration of "proper name," a political recognition, because "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" is not the name of the Taliban's organization, but the name of the country it used during its time in power. "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It retained this name after its overthrow in late 2001, more as a banner for a "government-in-exile" than as a mere organizational name. The "shadow government" system of the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" has spread throughout the country. That's why former Afghan President Karzai was so shy about calling the Taliban by that name. The U.S. influence over President Ghani is significantly stronger than it was under Karzai's government, as it appeased Ghani's government with a lengthy suffix, thus fulfilling the Taliban's greatest wish more than 20 years ago.
Another important signal from the peace agreement is that the United States has formally "delegated" responsibility to the Taliban for "ensuring that Afghan territory is not used to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. On the surface, this appears to be an acknowledgement and acceptance by the United States of the fundamental political fact on the ground in Afghanistan that the Taliban has strong influence over various nongovernmental armed forces. But the political implications and long-term effects are worthy of attention.
(II) Religious Beliefs and Ideological Differences
The differences in religious beliefs and ideologies between the two sides are obvious. The cultural underpinnings of mainstream American values are inextricably linked to Christianity (Protestantism), while the Taliban believe in Islam. The U.S. government promotes freedom, equality, democracy, and human rights, while the Taliban believes in the superiority and sanctity of Shariah law. The two sides' quarrels, which began in 1997, are also marked by strong religious beliefs and ideological overtones. For example, the U.S. severely criticized the Taliban's women's policies and penalties and demanded that they be corrected. The Taliban, on the other hand, are adamant that their policies are derived from the so-called "holy Shariah" and are a matter of principle that cannot be compromised.
So, will religious and ideological differences lead to another political confrontation in the future? Not necessarily. There are clear precedents, particularly typical of the special relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Even in the history of U.S.-Taliban relations, faith and ideological differences were not initially obstacles. For example, between 1994-1996, the U.S. government was not critical of similar policies pursued by the Taliban in areas under their control. A State Department spokesman once made clear that there was "nothing wrong" with the Taliban's imposition of Shariah law. When the Taliban regime was first established, President Clinton publicly said that if the United States could cooperate with Saudi Arabia on judicial matters, it could also cooperate with the Taliban.
It should be said that political confrontation in international relations is a subjective choice of the actors. The similarities and differences in beliefs and ideologies between the two sides are only potential political resources and weapons. Whether and when and how to use this political resource depends entirely on the political will, goals, and choices of both sides. Compared with other types of resources and weapons, faith and ideology are special in two main ways. One, it can greatly enhance the rank of the established attributes of the relationship (friend or foe) and give a sacred veneer to secular interests. For example, it can elevate secular alliances to "sacred alliances" and adapt secular conflicts of interest to "justice and injustice, civilization and barbarism". Secondly, it can mobilize, unite and organize the people to the maximum extent, stimulate their strong feelings of religious faith and turn them into the power of political action. History has repeatedly shown that once both sides of a political struggle involve faith and ideology, the conflict will escalate sharply and the contradictions will become more difficult to resolve.
In the final analysis, objective differences in beliefs and values do not in themselves necessarily lead to political conflict. The so-called confrontational conflicts between different religions and ideologies are in fact inseparable from the real interests of the actors, and are a reflection of the existing political confrontation between the two sides at the level of values and beliefs. the fierce quarrel between the U.S. and the Taliban about freedom, human rights and beliefs at the end of the 20th century boiled down to the Taliban's unwillingness to submit to the U.S. will to power, firstly by refusing to hand over bin Laden, and secondly by not being willing to adjust their women's policies to U.S. demands. Ultimately there is only one real reason for the back-and-forth: bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda.
(iii) Third-Party Factors
U.S.-Taliban relations never exist in isolation, and the influence of third-party factors should never be underestimated. The third-party forces between them include both state and non-state actors. Among them, the most influential state actors are Iran and the Afghan government. In recent years, Iran's relationship with the Taliban has improved significantly and will be one of the biggest variables in future U.S.-Taliban relations. Whether the reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban goes smoothly or not will directly affect whether the U.S. can complete the withdrawal of its troops as agreed, and thus whether the U.S.-Taliban relationship can enter a new phase smoothly. Overall, the powerful U.S. has many tools and resources at its disposal to hold or manipulate a number of state actors, and Iran and Afghanistan are no exception. By contrast, some non-state actors are outside the U.S.'s ability to manipulate them.
Al-Qaeda certainly leads the list of non-state actors influencing U.S.-Taliban relations, and between 1996 and 2001, the United States specifically approached the Taliban on 30 occasions to expel or hand over bin Laden, using almost all conventional means to do so, including promises of aid, condemnation, missile attacks, economic sanctions, international isolation, war, and the use of the Taliban. economic sanctions, international isolation, war, peace talks, etc., all without success. The Taliban's "special relationship" with bin Laden is of great concern to the international community because of its persistent refusal to compromise. In fact, the relationship between bin Laden and the Taliban is quite complex and deserves a separate article. There are three reasons why Al-Qaeda has become the primary third-party factor in U.S.-Taliban relations.
First, bin Laden's hostility to the United States was the underlying cause. Since 1991, bin Laden has made anti-U.S. "aspirations" a priority. Public advocacy of anti-American ideas and constant attacks on American targets have become his way of life and values. This has nothing to do with where he lives. The United States, of course, did not stand idly by: it repeatedly put pressure on bin Laden's country of residence, aiming to reduce his living space. Thus, the hostility between bin Laden and the United States evolved into a contest between the United States and bin Laden's host country. The basic storyline of this contest is that if host country A obeys U.S. orders to expel bin Laden, the U.S. then exerts pressure on the new host country B, which hosts bin Laden; if B does not comply, it will be punished and retaliated by the U.S. For example, in 1992 bin Laden was deported to exile in Sudan because he was openly anti-American and anti-Saudi royalty, and in 1995, after he attacked a U.S. military training base in Riyadh, the United States joined Egypt in pressuring Sudan to expel bin Laden. So, in the spring of 1996, he left for Afghanistan. In other words, the Taliban regime became bin Laden's "patron" as a direct result of successful U.S. pressure on the Sudanese government. From this perspective, the political contest between the U.S. and bin Laden's host country is merely a continuation of the U.S. hostility with bin Laden. Thus, it can be said both that bin Laden was a third party in the U.S.-Taliban relationship and that the Taliban regime was a third party in the U.S.-bin Laden relationship.
Second, bin Laden chose Afghanistan when he was forced to leave Sudan, not to defect to the Taliban, but from another source. First, due to the continued U.S. repression, he did not have many options for a place to stay. Second, he had participated in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and was relatively familiar with the local situation. It should be noted that when bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in May 1996, the Taliban had not yet seized power. When his private plane landed in Jalalabad, the force in control of the province was the Jalalabad Shura, not the Taliban. And he was able to enter without incident because he had the consent of the Mujahideen government and the Jalalabad Shura in advance.
Third, the United States did not have an extradition agreement with any Afghan government before 2001. Combing through the U.S.-Taliban bargaining on the bin Laden issue actually reveals an interesting phenomenon. On the U.S. side, it refuses to recognize the Taliban regime and establish diplomatic relations with it, yet it keeps asking the Taliban government for diplomatic support and cooperation. The Taliban, of course, understand the importance of bin Laden to the United States, and while using various reasons to stall and delay, they hope that the United States will exchange diplomatic recognition for it. "After the September 11 attacks, the seriousness of the problem multiplied, and the Taliban made concessions, offering to hand over bin Laden to Pakistan to form an international tribunal to try him in accordance with Islamic law. But the United States insisted that he be put on trial in the United States and gave the Taliban a list of demands, asking it to agree to form a coalition government, close terrorist training camps, hand over a group of leaders from Al-Qaeda, repatriate all detained foreigners, and so on. The Taliban thus decided that bin Laden was just a pretext for the United States, and that no matter what it did, it would be difficult to exchange diplomatic recognition for the United States, and firmly rejected the U.S. demands. The then White House security adviser later recalled that the Taliban's concern was that handing over bin Laden to the United States would neither change the U.S. attitude nor put itself in a difficult position.
There were other reasons for the Taliban's reluctance to hand over bin Laden. The Pashtun law regarding the morality of sheltering guests (melmastia) was one of them. Another reason was that bin Laden had successfully packaged himself as an "anti-American hero" with the "help" of the Western media and the new right-wing forces in the United States. In March 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Omar's envoy said in Washington that the U.S. approach of making bin Laden public enemy number one made it more difficult for the Taliban to hand him over. It's not easy for us to do that," he said. This man has become a hero. Thanks to (U.S.) cruise missiles, he has become famous. And before that he was nothing."
Now that bin Laden and Omar are both dead, the U.S. and the Taliban have signed a peace agreement. For the first time in the history of U.S.-Taliban relations, the agreement covers Al-Qaeda: The Taliban pledged to prevent "forces such as Al-Qaeda" from using Afghan territory to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. This is in fact a goal that the United States has pursued since the Taliban came to power.
So, does this commitment mean that U.S.-Taliban relations can henceforth be free from the shadow of Al-Qaeda? Apparently not. The relevant elements of the agreement precisely reaffirm Al-Qaeda's influence on the relationship. Ostensibly, the Taliban's commitment applies to "any individual or organization" that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies, but Al-Qaeda is the only one named, and it appears twice. Thus, it can be argued that whether the peace agreement will truly be a turning point in U.S.-Taliban relations depends in large part on the third-party factor represented by Al-Qaeda. The U.S. government is clearly not confident that the Taliban will cut ties with Al-Qaeda as promised. M. Pompeo repeatedly stressed to the media the day after the agreement was signed that it is important to listen to what they say and watch what they do. He said, "Don't believe anything. We need compliance. The key is action."
III. Conclusion
The United States and the Taliban were not born enemies and were only in full-blown hostility during the Bush Jr. administration. In 2009, the U.S. government began to seek reconciliation when it began to recognize the basic fact that the Taliban were a significant political force in Afghanistan. After 10 years of efforts, the two sides finally reached a peace agreement in late February 2020. The agreement could bring the two sides into a new phase of relations.
In the peace agreement, the United States committed to withdrawing its troops. Withdrawal is not the same as leaving. On the contrary, the peace agreement also helps strengthen the U.S. position in Afghanistan. The strategic value of the new agreement needs to be understood in the context of two other political contexts. One, the United States was involved in nurturing the Afghan national security forces, which remain its main pillar to this day. Second, the United States has a Permanent Strategic Partnership Agreement (2012) and a Bilateral Security Agreement (2014) with the Afghan government. That is to say, the U.S. is fairly well entrenched in the Afghan government and military. Achieving reconciliation with the Taliban has the potential to improve the overall U.S. presence and image in Afghanistan and expand its channels of influence. It would no longer be an enemy of Afghanistan's own political forces. Better yet, both the Afghan government and the Taliban would be involved in escorting U.S. security and ensuring that Afghanistan is not used to threaten the United States. Whether this ideal state becomes a reality depends on two additional conditions: the success of the intra-Afghan political reconciliation process and the Taliban's ability to fulfill their peace agreement commitments. The process of achieving these two conditions is fraught with variables.
The major factors that have shaped U.S.-Taliban relations in the past will play a role in the present and for some time to come, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Realistic interests are a constant in the U.S.-Taliban relationship and will continue to bind both sides in the future. The peace treaty itself is in fact an exchange of benefits: the Taliban is formally recognized by the United States; the United States receives a commitment from the Taliban to "associate" with the protection of its national security. For the U.S., withdrawal would not only be a potential strategic gain in Afghanistan, but would also mean significant savings in military spending and more resources for a new global military strategy. If the first phase of withdrawal is completed successfully and does not trigger a significant deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, the peace agreement could also serve as a political capital for Trump's campaign.
Third-party forces will be the litmus test for current and future U.S.-Taliban relations. Compared to the late 20th century, the composition and attributes of this variable are more complex. On the one hand, geopolitical and major power competition dynamics are tense, and the Taliban's relationship with Iran has improved significantly; on the other hand, in addition to Al-Qaeda, radical and extremist forces such as the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State (ISKP) have risen to prominence. The Taliban's relationship with Iran is deeply intertwined. There have also been significant changes in the Taliban's own organizational structure and authority system. As a result, third-party factors will be a fragile part of the relationship for some time to come. Whether third-party forces play a positive or negative role will ultimately depend on whether they are enemies or friends of the U.S. and the Taliban, respectively, and to some extent on whether the Taliban can "match" U.S. interests in this multiple triangular relationship.
Religious and ideological differences are ostensibly the largest and most explosive rift between the U.S. and the Taliban. But this variable is not active in itself and lies dormant in the deepest part of the structure of the relationship. The 2020 peace agreement itself is an example of its "absence. Whether and when it will be activated in the future ultimately depends on the political choices of the U.S.-Taliban and, in particular, the Taliban's ability to cooperate with U.S. regional and global strategic objectives - the history of U.S.-Taliban relations shows that the U.S. is the provocateur and the aggressor in the ideological and values discourse. provocateur and offensive party, while the Taliban is primarily defensive. This relationship structure will not be reversed in the foreseeable future. Therefore, this variable will be irrelevant if the two sides cooperate well in real-world matters in the future. If the conflicting real-life interests of the two sides intensify, such as in the late 20th century when there was a lack of cooperation by the Taliban on issues of vital interest to the U.S., it will be activated and political conflict will intensify.
It took the United States and the Taliban 10 years to reach a peace agreement. A textual peace is not the same as a real peace. The implementation of the agreement also involved quarrels and mutual accusations. Given the complexity of the local political ecology, it is normal that the timeline for the peace agreement will not be completed on time. The real bad situation is that the two sides tear up the peace agreement, the war in Afghanistan escalates, and the unrest and conflict spill over to the whole Central and South Asia region.
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